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largest for female, younger, and less-educated workers – those who change jobs frequently – while the 
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What is the price of protection? This paper estimates the social costs, in terms of potentially lower 
employment and wages, of common-law protections designed to protect American workers from wrongful 
discharge. Economic theory suggests that employment protection is a double-edged sword. It provides 
employment security to incumbent workers but makes employers reluctant to hire, leading to a less flexible 
labor market with potentially lower employment and wages. It is frequently argued that the stagnant 
employment performance of many European economies during the 1980s and 1990s – ‘Eurosclerosis’ – can 
be attributed in part to the significant employment protection given European workers (see Lazear, 1990 
and Blanchard and Wolfers, 1999; Krueger and Pischke, 1998 provide a contrasting view). Among the 
obstacles to testing this hypothesis is the difficulty of making reliable inferences using cross-country 
comparisons.  
In this paper, we study the impacts of employment protection in the United States. Numerous scholars 
have examined the effects of American federal employment laws on employment and unemployment. 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), DeLeire (2000), and Jolls and Prescott (2004) present evidence that the 
Americans with Disabilities Act decreased employment of disabled persons. Oyer and Schaefer (2000, 
2002) conclude that the federal Civil Rights Act of 1991 increased the frequency of mass layoffs and raised 
the returns to experience for workers who have a downward sloping ‘age-litigation’ profile. Hahn, Todd, 
and van der Klaauw (2001) also evaluate the costs of federal anti-discrimination laws. A major hurdle for 
each of these studies is that these federal statutes apply all at once to the entire country. This makes it 
difficult to separate the effects of the statute from all other changes occurring simultaneously (cf. Donohue, 
1998; Donohue and Heckman, 1991).1 
This paper overcomes this methodological challenge by exploiting variation in the extent and timing of 
adoption of employment protections across U.S. states. The United States, uniquely in the industrialized 
                                                     
1 Chay (1998) circumvents this problem in looking at the impact of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 
which extended the federal prohibition on discrimination to firms with 15-24 employees, by using the variation across 
industries in the fraction of workers employed in firms that would become subject to federal antidiscrimination law by 
virtue of this legislative expansion. Jolls and Prescott (2004) use state variation in disability laws existing prior to the 
adoption of the federal Americans with Disability Act (ADA) to shed light on the employment impact of the passage 
of the ADA. 
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world, has long had a legal presumption that workers can be fired “at will” – that is, “for good cause, bad 
cause, or no cause at all.”2 During the 1970s and 1980s, this presumption eroded rapidly: most U.S. state 
courts created 3 classes of common-law restrictions that limited employers’ ability to fire. These exceptions 
garnered media headlines, created costly litigation, and perhaps as importantly, generated substantial 
uncertainty among employers about when they could terminate workers with impunity. We refer to these 
common-law exceptions as wrongful-discharge laws, and define their precise meaning below. 
Our empirical analysis is aided by the considerable variation across states in the timing and extent of 
their recognition of wrongful-discharge laws. Three states – Florida, Georgia, and Rhode Island – have 
never altered the employment-at-will doctrine. Ten states now recognize each of 3 broad classes of 
exception to the at-will doctrine: the implied-contract, public-policy, and good-faith exceptions. A few 
states have rejected prior adoptions (see Appendix Table 1).3 We use this variation across states and over 
time to analyze how wrongful discharge laws affect employment and earnings in state labor markets.  
We are not the first to explore these effects. In a widely cited line of research, Dertouzos and Karoly 
(1992 and 1993) used an instrumental-variables framework to test whether wrongful-discharge laws 
affected state-level employment. They found surprisingly large impacts. Dertouzos and Karoly estimate that 
states adopting a tort-based cause of action (that is, one in which plaintiffs may sue employers for full 
compensatory and punitive damages) suffered a 3 percent reduction in aggregate state employment – 
roughly equivalent to a 10 percent employer-side tax on wages – with an additional 1 or 2 percent 
employment decline for states also adopting a contract-based protection, that is, one in which plaintiffs may 
                                                     
2 This quotation is from Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad, Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1884. Morriss, 1994, 
provides a detailed history of the employment-at-will doctrine. 
3 To date, only Montana (in 1987) has passed a statute establishing a good-cause standard for all employment 
terminations. All other employment-at-will exceptions are common-law doctrines, i.e., case law. In 1991, the Uniform 
Law Commissioners proposed a Model Employment Termination Act similar to the Montana statute, but no state has 
yet adopted it. In 1996, the Arizona legislature passed a statute affirming employment at will. Krueger (1991) provides 
an econometric study of the factors leading state legislatures to consider statutory exceptions to the doctrine of 
employment at will. 
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sue only for economic losses.4 These findings have not gone unchallenged. Morriss (1995) criticized 
Dertouzos and Karoly’s legal variables. More recently, Thomas Miles (2000) used a differences-in-
differences approach to estimate the impact of wrongful-discharge doctrines. He reports “no statistically 
significant effects on either employment or unemployment,” but does not comment on the source of the 
discrepancy between his findings and those of Dertouzos and Karoly.5 
Our paper joins this debate by comprehensively reevaluating the impacts of wrongful-discharge 
doctrines on employment and wages using richer data and a more complete coding of the case law than 
previous work. As with the Dertouzos/Karoly and Miles studies, our key explanatory variables are the 
precedent-setting cases that establish the wrongful-discharge laws recognized in each state and time period. 
We differ from previous studies, however, by using legal and employment data observed at monthly 
intervals, by measuring wage as well as employment impacts, and by exploring these impacts separately by 
education and gender demographic subgroups over the short and longer term. We apply robust estimation 
techniques throughout, and we validate our findings across time periods, outcome measures, and 3 distinct 
data sources.  
Although we had anticipated that our reanalysis would reconfirm the null hypothesis accepted by 
Thomas Miles, we instead find a modest but robustly negative impact of one wrongful-discharge doctrine – 
the implied-contract exception – on the employment to population rate in state labor markets. This impact, 
which averages –0.8 to –1.6 percent, exists for all education and gender groups, and is detectable among 
states adopting at several time intervals during the sample. The short-term impact is most pronounced for 
demographic subgroups that change jobs most frequently: females, and younger and less-educated workers. 
Over the longer term (4 to 7 years), however, the costs of implied-contract protection appear to be borne by 
                                                     
4 Dertouzos and Karoly (1988) earlier examined the direct costs of wrongful-discharge litigation in California. They 
found these direct costs to be modest, amounting to some $100 per termination. See also Dertouzos and Karoly (1992, 
p. xi) (presenting findings of 1988 study). 
5 In related work, Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) find that a state’s adoption of wrongful-discharge doctrines 
significantly slows the job-to-job flows of unemployed relative to employed workers. Autor (2003) and Miles (2000) 
find that employers increased demand for temporary-help agency employment when states adopted common-law 
exceptions to employment at will. 
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older and more-educated workers – those most likely to litigate. We find limited evidence that the good-
faith exception reduced state employment levels by a similar magnitude, but this finding is not robust. By 
contrast, we find no evidence that these legal doctrines had any significant impact on workers’ wages. We 
therefore conclude that the costs of these mandates appear to accrue at the employment rather than the wage 
margin.6  
Our companion paper, Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2004, ‘ADS’ hereafter) demonstrates why prior 
studies have reached opposing conclusions, ranging from no effect to very large negative effects. Briefly 
summarized, ADS shows that the exceedingly large disemployment effects estimated by Dertouzos and 
Karoly – 3 to 5 times the magnitude of our estimates – appear driven by problematic instrumental variables 
that are spuriously correlated with regional employment trends that substantially predate states’ adoption of 
wrongful-discharge laws. By contrast, the discrepancies with the methodologically similar by Miles are 
explained by his reliance on a classification of case law developed by Walsh and Schwarz (1996) that 
differs from ours. As ADS details, the Walsh and Schwarz classification neglects to code the initial 
precedent-setting case law in a large number of instances (20 of 94).7 By appropriately modifying the Walsh 
and Schwarz classification, we find that the Miles results may be reconciled with our own. 
I. Wrongful-discharge laws 
 
A. Definition and legal significance 
Since the heyday of employment at will in the early 20th century, legislatures, courts, and other market 
institutions have repeatedly encroached on U.S. employers’ discretion to terminate workers at will. First, 
unions have negotiated “just cause” contractual protection against firing for their members.8 Second, federal 
                                                     
6 A variety of studies find incomplete pass-through of employer mandates into wage levels, including Lazear (1990) 
and Fishback and Kantor (1995). By contrast, Gruber (1994) finds that the cost of mandated maternity benefits in the 
United States was entirely offset by a decline in women’s wages. 
7 This discrepancy reflects differences in the intended purposes for which the legal classifications were developed. As 
described in Section II, our legal classification attempts to identify the first case in a state that might trigger a client 
letter from attorneys warning about a change in law. By contrast, Walsh and Schwarz select cases that best articulate 
courts’ rationales for promulgating a new doctrine. These cases often follow the initial precedent-setting decision by 
several years. 
8 Indeed, any employment contract for a specified term of years ordinarily cannot be terminated prior to the stipulated 
ending date without some particularized showing of cause.  See, for example, California Labor Code § 2924, which 
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and state legislatures have enacted broad statutes constraining employers’ discretion to fire workers 
belonging to ‘protected classes,’ defined by race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, and 
union membership.9 Additional narrow statutes also bar terminations for specific reasons, for example, to 
prevent pension benefits from vesting or to retaliate against employees for whistle-blowing or performing 
jury duty.10 
Third, and central for this analysis, during the 1970s and 1980s the majority of U.S. state courts adopted 
one or more common-law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine that limited employers’ ability to 
fire. These are: 1) the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (‘public-policy exception’); 2) 
the implied covenant to terminate only in good faith and fair dealing (‘good-faith’ exception); and 3) the 
implied-in-fact contract not to terminate without good cause (‘implied-contract’ exception). We define these 
exceptions in turn and discuss their significance. 
First recognized by the California Supreme Court in 1959, the public-policy exception gained 
widespread recognition in the 1980s: 34 states adopted this exception between 1979 and 1994, and a total of 
43 by 1999. The public-policy exception provides employees with protections against discharges that would 
thwart an important public policy, such as performing jury duty, filing a worker’s compensation claim, 
reporting an employer’s wrongdoing, or refusing to commit perjury.11 In the majority of states, the public-
policy doctrine provides tort-based protection, meaning that plaintiffs can sue for lost earnings, pain and 
suffering, and punitive damages. Despite its widespread recognition, successful cases – particularly those 
                                                                                                                                                                              
provides:  “An employment for a specified term may be terminated at any time by the employer in case of any willful 
breach of duty by the employee in the course of his employment, or in case of his habitual neglect of his duty or 
continued incapacity to perform it.”  Increasingly, high corporate executives are also signing contracts that reward 
them with large severance payouts unless they are fired for gross negligence, malfeasance, or some other act of serious 
misconduct.   
9 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) (enacted 1935) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of union status); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621-634; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 – 12213. 
10 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 11, 29 U.S.C. 660(c) (prohibiting discrimination against employees 
exercising rights under OSHA); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140; New 
York Judiciary Law § 519 (prohibiting discharge of employee due to absence from employment for jury service). 
11 As Schwab (1996) discusses, courts tend to apply this exception to the at-will doctrine when the termination clearly 
affects third parties.  
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with multi-million-dollar judgments – are rare. One reason is that courts typically limit public-policy cases 
to clear violations of express legislative commands rather than violations of a vaguer sense of public 
obligation. Accordingly, some legal scholars have argued that the public-policy doctrine is of minor legal 
and economic significance (see Edelman et al 1992). 
Like the public-policy exception, the good-faith exception also prevents employers from firing workers 
for ‘bad cause.’ A leading example is the case of Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., where the 
employer fired a salesperson just before a substantial commission was due.12 The court found that the 
employer had deprived the plaintiff of the “benefit of his bargain” and awarded compensatory and punitive 
damages. Read broadly, the good-faith doctrine could have sweeping consequences, serving as a general 
prohibition against terminating any worker without ‘just cause’ (that is, economic necessity or poor 
performance). In point of fact, the 11 state courts that currently recognize this doctrine have primarily 
limited good-faith awards to ‘timing’ cases in which the employer intentionally deprives the worker of a 
promised benefit, such as a sales commission or pension benefit.13 Hence, like the public-policy exception, 
the good-faith doctrine has found relatively narrow application. 
Finally, 43 states recognize the implied-contract exception. This protection comes into force when an 
employer implicitly promises not to terminate a worker without good cause. A landmark decision 
establishing the implied-contract exception was the 1980 case of Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, in 
which a dismissed worker successfully sued for breach of contract by citing an internal personnel policy 
handbook stating that it was Blue Cross’s policy to terminate employees only for just cause.14 The court 
held that the handbook implied a binding contract, and the worker was remunerated for breach of contract. 
                                                     
12 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977). 
13 Many of the states that recognize the good-faith exception allow for full tort compensatory and punitive damages, 
although California prominently stopped doing so in the case Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 
1988). Oklahoma and New Hampshire previously recognized good-faith as a distinct action but reversed their prior 
decisions in 1989 and 1980, respectively. During our period of study, California recognized a very broad good-faith 
obligation (even with the Foley holding that successful plaintiffs would be limited to receiving contract damages).   In 
Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000), after our period of study, the court restricted good-faith claims 
primarily to ‘timing’ cases. 
14 292 N.W.2d. 880 (Michigan, 1980). 
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An equally influential 1981 California case, Pugh v. See’s Candies, expanded the implied-contract notion 
by finding that workers may be entitled to ongoing employment due to longevity of service, a history of 
promotion or salary increases, general company policies, or typical industry practices.15 In the subsequent 
five years, courts in 25 other states adopted an implied-contract exception.  
The expected employer costs of the implied-contract exception are difficult to assess. Two factors limit 
employer risk. First, implied-contract cases lead only to contractual damages (that is, economic rather than 
punitive or full compensatory damages), so spectacular jury awards are unlikely.16 Second, employers can 
potentially insulate themselves from implied-contract claims by rewriting employment contracts and 
handbooks to state clearly that all employment contracts are at will.17 On the other hand, the factors creating 
an implied-contract claim are vaguer than for a public-policy claim, which likely contributes to employer 
uncertainty about the litigation risks entailed.18 Additionally, unlike the public-policy and good-faith 
doctrines (as they have developed), the implied-contract doctrine can potentially reclassify an employer’s 
entire workforce as not at will. In this case, the employer may only terminate its employees for good cause 
– which is far more likely to constrain employers than the specific ‘bad causes’ prohibited by the public-
policy and good-faith exceptions.19 Hence, paradoxically, the implied-contract doctrine is easier to ‘contract 
around’ and potentially less costly per litigant than other wrongful-discharge protections, yet is also more 
sweeping. 
Unfortunately, no comprehensive data exist on the number or outcome of wrongful-discharge cases 
                                                     
15 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
16 Plaintiffs’ attorneys will often append claims from fraud or defamation to their implied-contracts complaints in an 
attempt to get before a jury on a claim for punitive damages. 
17 It remains a complex legal question, however, whether an employer that once issued a handbook or other promise of 
job security can modify it to create at-will employment. Several courts have held that such unilateral changes by the 
employer are not binding on incumbent employees that have previously received promises of job security. 
18 Schwab (1993) offers a unified framework for interpreting implied-contract cases.   
19 The legal consequences of an implied contract are not always identical to those of an actual contract.  For example, 
a worker who is covered by an explicit good cause provision who is terminated for, say, harassing a fellow worker will 
prevail if the jury believes the harassment did not occur.  In an implied-contract case, however, courts frequently hold 
that the discharged worker cannot prevail without showing that the employer did not reasonably believe the 
harassment occurred, thereby protecting reasonable judgments made by employers in good faith.  Cotran v. Rollins 
Hudig Hall International, Inc., 17 Cal.4th 93 (1998). 
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under these three doctrines.20 Several findings in the literature suggest, however, that the implied-contract 
exception – and wrongful-discharge laws more generally – may have changed employers’ hiring and 
termination practices. First, Miles (2000) and Autor (2003) find that employers substantially increased their 
use of temporary-help-agency workers shortly after their states adopted implied-contract exceptions. 
Second, Kugler and Saint Paul (2004) find that the hiring odds of unemployed workers declined after courts 
in their states recognized wrongful-discharge protections, particularly the implied-contract exception. Third, 
sales of Employment Practices Liability Insurance (EPLI) policies, which insure employers against 
litigation risk, become widespread in the 1990s. While EPLI shields employers from liability under both 
federal anti-discrimination (and other) statutes and state common-law wrongful discharge protections, an 
authority on EPLI interviewed for this research averred that “how protective wrongful-discharge laws are in 
a particular state is an important factor in setting EPLI premiums.”21 This suggests that wrongful-discharge 
laws impose real costs. 
B. Hypothesized effects on the labor market 
As discussed by Lazear (1990) and Blanchard and Katz (1997), the theoretical impact of firing 
restrictions on employment levels is ambiguous. In a frictionless labor market, the Coase theorem predicts 
that imposition of employer-side firing costs will be fully undone by efficient worker-firm bargains; for 
example, workers would post a bond equal to the firing cost. Where the Coasean result does not hold, firing 
costs reduce employers’ incentives to hire new workers and to fire incumbent workers (Donohue, 1989). 
This dampens employment fluctuations, which can raise or lower employment levels in the short term. Over 
the longer term, if employment protections raise employment costs without yielding corresponding 
productivity increases, a simple supply and demand model would predict that employment levels and/or 
wages are likely to fall. This effect is exacerbated if firing restrictions encourage workers to engage in rent-
                                                     
20 Nor would this caseload data provide a full measure of the economic costs of wrongful-discharge laws since the 
observed caseload is an equilibrium function of employer decisions to avert or settle suits and employee incentives to 
file suits.  
21 Interview with Richard S. Betterley, publisher of the Betterley Report, a leading survey of EPLI insurance carriers 
(Jan 23, 2004). 
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seeking (i.e., non-meritorious) litigation or induce employers to retain unproductive workers to avoid 
litigation. 
Not all (non-Coasean) employment protection adversely impacts labor market efficiency, however. 
Employment protection can be viewed as a mandated employment benefit that, while costly for employers 
to provide, is also valued by employees (Summers, 1989). By raising employer costs, mandated 
employment protection shifts labor demand inward. But to the degree that workers value the mandated 
benefit, labor supply simultaneously shifts outward, muting the adverse employment impact. If employees 
value the benefit at its full marginal cost, wages will in theory fall to cover the cost of providing the benefit 
and employment levels will be unaffected (see, for example, Gruber, 1994).22  
While the overall impact of erosions of the at-will doctrine on employment or unemployment is not 
clear a priori, existing evidence suggests that the impact may differ for different groups of workers. Several 
studies find that the employment of younger, less-educated workers appears most likely to be harmed by 
wrongful-discharge protections, while older and more-educated workers appear to benefit (OECD, 1999 
and 2004; Jolls, 2000; Bertola, Blau and Kahn, 2002). We examine these disparate impacts in depth below 
and find important differences by demographic group that depend on the time horizon examined. 
II. Data sources and model specification 
 
A. Data sources 
To measure employment and earnings, we draw on the complete Current Population Survey (CPS) 
monthly files for the years 1978 to 1999. The CPS provides individual labor-force data for approximately 
100,000 adults per survey month starting in 1978 and contains wage data for one-quarter of the employed 
sub-sample beginning in 1979.23 We calculate employment-to-population ratios by state, month, and year, 
and use micro data on hourly earnings in models for hourly wages. In some analyses, we also present results 
                                                     
22 Moreover, as several authors have argued, adverse selection in labor markets may cause employers to provide 
inefficiently low levels of job security (Aghion and Hermalin, 1990; Levine, 1991). Restrictions on firing could 
therefore raise employment while reducing wages. This would correspond to a case where workers value job security 
more at the margin than it costs employers to provide. 
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for eight demographic subgroups distinguished by gender, education, and age. In section V, we verify the 
CPS-based employment results using independent data from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) data. 
The CES data offer a longer time series but lower precision. 
To maximize usable variation in the timing of the adoption of wrongful-discharge laws, we code the 
legal and employment variables at monthly frequency, as done by Morriss (1995). Hence, if two states 
adopt a wrongful-discharge doctrine 11 months apart within the same calendar year, our estimates 
accurately account for this substantial difference in timing. Because the outcome data are observed at high 
frequency, serial correlation is a major concern. Following the recommendations of Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004), we compute standard errors using the generalized Huber-White formula clustered by 
state. This allows for arbitrary error correlations among state-month observations.24 In addition, we focus 
our analysis on relatively short pre-post intervals surrounding law adoption to isolate discrete effects on 
labor market outcomes. 
For our legal variables, we developed a taxonomy of wrongful-discharge law prevailing in each state 
and month-year for the three-decade period from 1970 to 1999. As Morriss (1995) discusses, it is not 
always easy to date when a state has adopted a particular at-will exception. Our objective is easily stated, 
however. We envision management-side employment lawyers reading the advance sheets and writing 
awareness letters to their clients when major changes occur in the common law. Thus, we are interested in 
the first court decision in a state that would trigger a client letter warning about a law change. In practice, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
23 Individuals may appear up to four times in one calendar year in the employment sample (not the wage sample), 
though their labor-force status may differ on each occasion. Our estimation procedure takes account of potential serial 
correlation among observations within each state sample.  

























where jte  is the estimated residual for state i  at time t  and jtν  is a row vector of dependent variables (including the 
constant). This procedure is implemented in Stata software using the “cluster” command (clustering on state). 
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we looked for the first major appellate-court decision (either the intermediate court or the State Supreme 
Court) that signaled the sustained adoption of the particular at-will exception. Thus, a lower court decision 
adopting an exception that was reversed on appeal would not be counted, but a Supreme-Court decision or 
lower court decision not reversed would be counted. As it turned out, our independent assessment of the 
legal doctrines for the 50 states largely agrees with Morriss’s list of relevant cases, which we update to 
1999.25 Our companion paper (Autor, Donohue, and Schwab, 2004), shows that our findings are robust to 
the choice of the alternative legal classifications developed by Dertouzos and Karoly (1992) and Morriss 
(1995).26 
B. Model specification 
Because state courts adopted the common-law wrongful-discharge doctrines in different months and 
years during the 1980s and 1990s, we have potentially many ‘experiments’ to exploit. Our empirical 
approach contrasts the change in employment and wages in states adopting a given wrongful-discharge 
doctrine in a given period to states not adopting any doctrine during the same time period. 
To implement this difference-in-difference design, we must select a pre and post period for each 
contrast. Although we could use the entire 1978 to 1999 panel to calculate these contrasts, this has two 
disadvantages. First, because states adopted exceptions in the first year of our 1978-1999 CPS data set and 
as late as 1998, the long panel approach implies that for some states, observations from two decades before 
or after adoption would be used to form a pre/post contrast. This is unappealing. Second, the long panel 
approach exacerbates the serial correlation issue noted above.  
To mitigate these issues, we use as a baseline a five-year pre-post window: the 24 calendar months prior 
to adoption of a doctrine are designated as the pre-period; months 13 to 36 following adoption are 
designated as the post-period; and to allow for an adjustment interval, the first 12 months immediately 
                                                     
25 Although we use the three-part division of the at-will exceptions in the body of our analysis, we also explored the 
relevance of the tort/contract distinction on which Dertouzas and Karoly (1992) focus. We did not find this distinction 
to be relevant or empirically robust.  
26 As discussed in the Introduction, the Walsh and Schwarz (1996) classification used by Miles (2000) yields much 
weaker results. In ADS 2004, we trace this to the fact that Walsh and Schwarz do not necessarily code the precedent-
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following adoption are excluded from the sample. We later explore the sensitivity of our results to this set 
of choices by contrasting estimated short- and long-term labor market impacts. To form a control sample of 
non-adopting states, we include the maximal set of state-month observations for corresponding calendar 
months for states that did not adopt any of the three doctrines during the relevant pre/post treatment time 
interval. This design implies that some states serve as treatment states in one period and control states in 
another, although never within a five-year window surrounding treatment.27 
Our basic econometric model is 
(1) ,321 stststststst PostTreatPostTreatY εβββα +⋅+++=  
where stTreat  is an indicator for period from 24 months prior to 36 months post adoption of a wrongful-
discharge law in state s , and stPost  is an indicator for period 13 through 36 months after adoption. The 
coefficient of interest in this equation, 3β , is an estimate of the pre-post change in the outcome variable in 
adopting states relative to the corresponding change in non-adopting states. All estimates are weighted by 
the share of national residents ages 18 – 64 in each state-year cell.28 
We enrich this basic model in three ways. First, in place of the common main effect and pre-treatment 
indicators (α  and stTreat ), we add main effects for each state and their interactions with a treatment 
indicator variable. Second, to flexibly control for common shocks to national employment, we include an 
exhaustive set of time dummies, corresponding to each year and month of the sample. Finally, to account 
for common regional employment shocks, we also estimate specifications that include interactions between 
                                                                                                                                                                              
setting state cases but instead select the (typically later) cases that provide the clearest articulation of the newly 
adopted doctrines.  
27 For example, Maryland adopted the implied-contract exception in January of 1985, so the window of time around 
the commencement of treatment that enters our analysis begins at January 1983 (24 months before adoption) and 
continues through December 1987 (36 months after adoption). Observations for January 1983 to December 1984 form 
the Maryland pre-treatment sample, and observations from January 1986 to December 1987 form the Maryland post-
treatment sample. As control states, we use all observations from other state-months that were not ‘assigned to 
treatment’ during January 1983 through December 1987. Our model compares the change in the dependent variable in 
the treatment states across the pre- and post-periods to the change over the same years in the control states.  Starting in 
January 1988, Maryland may reenter the control sample for later treated states. 
28 We weight by population shares rather than population counts to avoid inadvertently placing greater weight on later 
observations due to growing national population.  
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calendar-year dummies and indicator variables denoting the 4 major Census geographic regions. With 
region controls included, the parameter 3β  is identified by contrasting contemporaneous employment or 
wage outcomes in adopting versus non-adopting states located in the same geographic regions.29 
III. Impacts on employment and earnings 
 
Before turning to estimates of equation (1), we provide a visual summary of the employment data in 
Figures 1 through 3. These figures plot estimated log employment to population rates in adopting relative to 
non-adopting states at monthly intervals in the 4 years prior through 8 years following the adoption of each 
doctrine. Employment levels in the first full month following adoption are normalized at 0, and the dashed 
lines in each figure represent robust 90 percent confidence intervals (accounting for arbitrary within state 
error correlations) for each monthly point estimate.30  
These figures provide initial evidence that one wrongful-discharge doctrine, the implied-contract 
exception, did indeed affect state employment levels. As is visible in Figure 1, relative (log) employment-
to-population rates for both males and females dip by approximately 1.5 to 2 percent over the 2 years 
following adoption of the implied-contract exception, reaching a nadir after approximately 24 to 30 months. 
By contrast, Figures 2 and 3 provide little evidence that the public-policy or good-faith exceptions affected 
employment levels. One should not make strong inferences from these figures, however. As is visible from 
                                                     
29 Since, as noted previously, treated states may contribute control observations 36 months after a law is adopted, the 
version of equation (1) that we implement is slightly richer. For each state that reenters the sample, we additionally 
add a ‘post-post’ dummy for the post-treatment period (that is, months 37-plus following law adoption). Hence, the 
version of equation (1) implemented is: 
,321 sttstststststssst PostPostPostTreatPostTreatY εδβββγγ +++⋅++⋅+=  
where sγ  and tδ  are vectors of state and time dummies. As a check on this specification, we estimate in Appendix 
Table 2 a set of models that restrict treated states from reentering the control sample 37 months following treatment.  
The Appendix Table 2 results are nearly identical to those in Table 1. 
30 Specifically, the figures plot the coefficient and 90 percent confidence bands from estimates of parameters τγ  from 









where, as above, stY , is the natural logarithm of the estimated employment to population ratio in state and time period 
s  and t , sδ  and tφ  are vectors of state and time main effects, and stL  is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 
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the wide standard-error bands, the monthly point estimates are relatively noisy. In addition, these models do 
not include the full set of controls that we later use for estimating equation (1). Nevertheless, the formal 
analysis of employment below largely bears out the impression given by the figures.31 
A. Initial estimates: Employment and Wages 
The first panel of Table 1 presents estimates of equation (1) for employment. What emerges clearly is 
that adoption of the implied-contract exception is associated with a modest but meaningful reduction in 
employment. In column 1 of Panel A, we estimate that adoption of the implied-contract doctrine reduces 
overall employment to population by 1.7 log points in the second and third years following adoption 
( 1.3=t ).32 Adding dummies to absorb region-by-year employment shocks reduces the absolute magnitude 
of this point estimate only slightly to  1.6 log points, and it remains highly significant ( 5.3=t ).  
The next two rows of the table repeat these estimates for the public-policy and good-faith doctrines. 
The public-policy doctrine is associated with a small reduction in employment, but this is never significant. 
The point estimates for the good-faith doctrine indicate larger employment reductions – in the range of 0.4 
to 0.6 log points – but these are also statistically insignificant. The low precision of the good-faith point 
estimates likely reflects the fact that there are fewer adoptions of the good-faith doctrine than the other 
exceptions: 10 for good faith versus 36 and 34 for implied contract and public policy.33  
To confirm that these results are not driven by sectoral trends, subsequent columns tabulate models 
estimated separately for manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment. In these models, the included 
time and region dummies implicitly account for sector-specific (manufacturing/non-manufacturing) shocks 
                                                                                                                                                                              
one (only) in the month that a state adopts a given doctrine (the impact of each doctrine is estimated simultaneously). 
Huber-White standard errors allow for arbitrary error correlations within states.  
31 We do not provide comparable plots for wage levels since the figures (and regression estimates in subsequent tables) 
show no evidence of a wage impact. 
32 We use the term log points to refer to a 0.01 change in the natural logarithm of the outcome measure. For the small 
effects measured here, log points are approximately equal to percentage points (equal to exp[log points]-1). 
33 Although a total of 43, 43, and 13 implied-contract, public-policy and good-faith exceptions were adopted, not all 
occur in our sample window. We analyze a longer sample frame in Table 6. 
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that could potentially induce bias.34 These models find significant negative effects of the implied-contract 
doctrine on both manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment. The point estimate for manufacturing 
employment is substantially larger than for non-manufacturing  (-3.0 versus -1.1 percent), but also 
estimated with substantially lower precision, due to the smaller scale and greater variability of 
manufacturing employment; hence, these point estimates are not significantly different at the 5 percent 
level. We again find no significant effect of the public-policy doctrine on employment. By contrast, the 
good-faith doctrine is associated with a large rise in manufacturing employment and a substantial decline in 
non-manufacturing employment. These effects appear driven by regional shocks, however. Neither point 
estimate proves robust to inclusion of region-by-year dummies.35  
Panel B of Table 1 presents comparable estimates for the impact of wrongful-discharge doctrines on log 
hourly earnings of employed workers. For these models, we fit the equation,  
(2) ,654 ijstjtsststststijst PostTreatPostTreatw επδγβββ ++++⋅++=  
where w  is 100 × the log hourly wage of individual i  belonging to demographic group j  in state s  and 
year-month t . In addition to the state and time effects used above, these models also include a vector of 
dummy variables, jπ , indicating membership in each of 8 demographic groups (female/male × ages 18-
39/40-54 × education high-school-or-less/some-college-plus). Standard errors are clustered by state, as 
above.36 
These estimates yield no evidence that wrongful-discharge doctrines affected earnings of employed 
                                                     
34 The dependent variable in these models is the logarithm of the ratio of employment in the sector (manufacturing or 
non-manufacturing) to total state population age 16-64. Models that instead use the logarithm of sectoral employment 
with no denominator yield comparable results. 
35 On the theory that costly employment protections may cause workers to substitute to the ‘unprotected sector,’ we 
also estimated models for self-employment rates by state and month (estimates available from the authors). In contrast 
to expectations, the signs of the point estimates for the self-employment outcome are in most cases equal to those for 
overall employment, suggesting no substitution (and perhaps indicating that self-employment and formal employment 
are complements). However, these estimates are in all cases economically small and statistically significant. We are 
not able to estimate comparable models for wages of since self-employed workers do not report earnings in the CPS 
MORG. 
36 As in the employment models, we also include a ‘post-post’ dummy variable for state-month observations where a 
state was previously ‘treated’ and reenters the sample as a control observation.  
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workers. For the implied-contract and public-policy doctrines, point estimates are uniformly small, 
precisely estimated, and very far from significant. The point estimates for the good-faith doctrine are 
uniformly negative and in some cases large, in the range -1.2 to -2.2 percent. But these point estimates are 
also insignificant, and their magnitude is substantially reduced by inclusion of region effects.  
As noted earlier, ‘treated states’ – that is, those that adopted a law during our sample period – may 
contribute observations to the ‘control’ group starting 36 months following law adoption. To provide a 
check on any potential bias induced by this procedure, we present in Appendix Table 2 a version of the 
Table 1 models where treated states do not enter the control sample. These models produce near-identical 
estimates to our main results in Table 1, suggesting that our procedure increases efficiency without inducing 
bias. 
B. Does the specific doctrine matter? 
Given the generally negative estimated impact of each category of doctrine on employment levels, one 
potential interpretation of these results is that the specific doctrine does not matter but simply whether the 
state has adopted any wrongful-discharge doctrine. To examine this issue, we estimate in Table 2 a set of 
models that compares the impacts of an ‘any doctrine’ variable with a disaggregated set of three doctrine 
variables. As with the previous models, we specify the two-year period prior to law change as the pre-
treatment period and the two-year period commencing one year after law change as the post-treatment 
period.37  
The first two columns of Table 2, panel A confirm that, on average, states adopting any exception to 
employment at will experienced an employment reduction of approximately 0.6 percent in the two years 
following adoption (not significant in either specification). Columns 3 and 4 replace the ‘any doctrine’ 
dummy with indicators for each of the three legal doctrines. When their effects are estimated jointly, only 
                                                     
37 An additional wrinkle in this specification is that several states adopt multiple doctrines within a five year window 
and hence the pre- and post- periods are not unique. In estimating these models, we include all relevant pre- and post-
treatment observations for a given state – meaning that some treatment and control periods overlap – and include, as in 
equation (1), treatment and treatment × post effects for each doctrine. Control observations are selected identically to 
the Table 1 models. 
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the implied-contract doctrine is statistically significant, and its point estimate is close to that in the prior 
table. The public-policy and good-faith doctrines are insignificant in all specifications.  
Subsequent columns, which repeat these estimates for manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, 
reinforce the earlier conclusions. The ‘any doctrine’ dummy is never significant by itself whereas the 
implied-contract doctrine is significant in all but one specification (column 11). The good-faith estimates 
are again opposite-signed for manufacturing and non-manufacturing and, as before, are not robust to 
inclusion of region effects. In sum, the implied-contract doctrine is the only wrongful-discharge law that 
appears to have a robust negative effect on employment. 
We next estimate a variant of equation (2) for wages where the effects of all three laws are estimated 
simultaneously. These results are found in panel B of the Table 2. As in Table 1, the estimated effect on 
wages of the implied-contract exception is seen to be small and insignificant, albeit positive. When region 
controls are included, none of the point estimates in this table is statistically significant, suggesting that 
either the wrongful-discharge doctrines had no robust wage effects, or that these effects are too small to 
detect.38  
C. Estimates by sub-period: A consistency check 
The preceding estimates pool all years of data to increase the precision of the estimates. The cost of this 
approach is that it masks any temporal heterogeneity in the economic impact of the doctrines. Table 3 
studies this potential heterogeneity by tabulating the effect of each exception on employment for the 
                                                     
38 One further possibility is that wage estimates may suffer from composition bias if, for example, wrongful-discharge 
laws ‘price low-wage workers out’ of the labor market.  The positive, but insignificant, wage coefficients for the 
implied-contract exception may be suggestive of such bias, if this legal change dampens employment in a way that 
disproportionately impacts low-wage workers.  To evaluate this bias, we followed Neal and Johnson (1996) and 
Chandra (2003) in estimating models for impacts on median wages for all potential workers, including the non-
employed. To perform these estimates, we assigned non-workers an arbitrarily low wage, thereby assuming that their 
potential earnings are below the median wage in their respective state-time-demographic group cell. Because this 
restriction excludes many female workers – and because we were not confident in the behavioral assumption that low 
earnings females are least likely to participate (see Neal, 2004) – we limited our analysis of median wage estimates to 
males, few of whom are affected by the 50-percent restriction. We generally find that estimates of the effects of 
wrongful-discharge laws on median wages are less positive when non-earners are included in the sample than when 
they are excluded, suggesting that wrongful-discharge laws reduce the participation of workers in low earnings cells. 
However, we found no robust, negative effects of wrongful-discharge laws on wage levels in these models. A table of 
estimates is available from the authors.  
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following adoption ‘cohorts’: 1980 to 1983, 1984 to 1987, 1988 to 1992, and 1993 to 1998.39  
As the first row of Table 3 shows, the 15 states that adopted the implied-contract exception during 1980 
to 1983 experienced a decline of –0.9 to –1.6 percent in employment during months 13 through 36 
following adoption (the smaller estimate corresponding to the model with region-by-year controls). The 18 
states that adopted this exception between 1984 and 1987 also experienced similarly large employment 
declines. For the final set of states that adopted the doctrine between 1988 and 1992, we also find a 
similarly negative employment effect (–1.8 percent). This point estimate is not significant at conventional 
levels, perhaps because only 3 states adopt the implied-contract doctrine in this period.  
The next 4 columns of Table 3 repeat these estimates for states adopting the public-policy and good-
faith exceptions.  In almost half of these regressions, the coefficient estimates are smaller than their 
accompanying standard errors.  For the other half, the estimated effects swing wildly in sign and magnitude 
for each doctrine and time period. This suggests either that these doctrines affect employment 
inconsistently, or, perhaps more plausibly, that their passage is confounded with other significant shocks to 
employment. By contrast, the consistency of the results for the implied-contract doctrine (across time 
periods and, in Table 2, across sectors) increases our confidence that this doctrine did have a modest but 
robust causal depressing effect on state employment rates.40 
D. Alternative timing assumptions 
Thus far, we have relied on our baseline specification, which uses the 24 months prior to adoption as 
our pre-treatment period and the months 13 to 36 following adoption as the post-treatment period. In Table 
4, we explore the sensitivity of our findings to alternative choices of pre- and post periods, and additionally 
measure the longer-term impacts of the wrongful-discharge doctrines. For reference, the first two columns 
                                                     
39 Adoption cohort dates refer to the year a wrongful-discharge doctrine is enacted.  As with prior estimates, the pre- 
and post-periods used to form the employment contrast are the surrounding five years (2 prior to adoption, 3 post 
adoption, with the first omitted). We do not study adoptions prior to 1980 to allow for the two year pre-treatment 
period. No state adopted an implied-contract or public-policy exception after 1992.  
40 Because there are strong regional patterns in wrongful-discharge doctrine adoptions (discussed in ADS 2004), we 
also estimated the Table 3 employment models separately for Southern and non-Southern states. In both regions, we 
find robust evidence that the implied-contract exception reduced employment to population rates by 1.3 to 1.8 log 
points.  
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of Table 4 repeat our baseline specification for employment from Table 2 (columns 1 and 2). Columns 3 
through 10 move the post-adoption treatment window closer to the point of adoption by 1 year (i.e., 
immediately thereafter) and then outward by 2, 4, and 6 years respectively.  
As with prior estimates, these sensitivity tests indicate that the public-policy doctrine is never 
significant, while the good-faith doctrine is typically insignificant, and never robust to inclusion of region 
effects. By contrast, varying the post-adoption comparison period produces a noteworthy pattern of 
coefficients for the implied-contract doctrine. We find that the disemployment effect of this exception 
appears to reach a maximum at 2 to 3 years following adoption, and then gradually decays. By years 6 and 
7, the estimated employment reduction is about one-half the size of the baseline and is insignificant (a 
pattern also suggested by Figure 1).  
What explains this re-convergence between adopting and non-adopting states?  One possibility is that 
this re-convergence is a statistical artifact: because the vast majority of states adopted the implied-contract 
exception by the end of our sample, relatively few pure ‘control states’ –  i.e., those yet to have adopted the 
implied-contract exception – are available to form a contrast towards the end of the sample.  Alternatively, 
re-convergence could exist if employers either originally over-estimated the costs of the implied-contract 
doctrine or over time learned how to minimize them. Given the initial uncertainty about the likely ultimate 
contours of the legal rules that would emerge after they were first introduced, it would not be surprising that 
employers would over-react to these judicial innovations, as suggested by the legal analysis of Edelman, 
Abraham and Erlanger (1992).  Moreover, the over-reaction hypothesis is buttressed by the evidence that 
professional (non-academic) law journals and personnel journals overstated the threat posed by the implied-
contract doctrine, which in itself would lead employers to react excessively.41 If over the longer term, 
businesses discovered that the laws did not substantially raise employment costs, this effect would likely 
have abated. If, however, the initial costs were real, it is still possible that firms would learn better how to 
                                                     
41 The business press likely contributed to the sense of alarm. A 1985 Business Week cover article entitled “The 
Revolution in Employee Rights” stated, “To minimize liability, corporations have to treat each dismissal as though it 
were under a ‘just cause’ provision of a contract” (Hoerr et al, 1985). Under the broadest reading of the case law in 
1985, this statement would have been true in only the 7 states that recognized the good faith exception. 
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avoid creating implied contracts – perhaps by having all new employees sign forms acknowledging their at-
will status – thereby reducing these costs after six or seven years. 
The final columns of Table 4 test the sensitivity of the employment results to the selection of the pre-
treatment period. By moving the pre-trebatment interval backward from the date of adoption, we check 
against the possibility that wrongful-discharge doctrines were adopted at cyclical employment peaks, 
thereby leading us to falsely attribute post-peak employment declines to the doctrines rather than the 
business cycle. Columns 11 and 12 compare employment in years 2 and 3 prior to adoption to employment 
in years 1 and 2 following adoption, while the final two columns perform this comparison for years 3 and 4 
prior to adoption. In neither case does the choice of the pre-treatment comparison window substantially 
affect the magnitude or precision of the main results. This suggests that our findings are unlikely to be 
driven by spurious timing effects.42 
IV. Are all workers equally affected?  
Like their European counterparts, U.S. wrongful-discharge laws disproportionately protect workers 
with longer tenure and higher wages. Long-tenure workers can more easily make a prima facie case that 
their jobs provided an expectation of ongoing employment (in the case of the implied-contract doctrine), or 
an expectation of future benefits for current service (good-faith doctrine). In addition, damage awards tend 
to be roughly proportional to prior earnings, particularly in implied-contract cases. Hence high-wage 
workers have a greater incentive to litigate, and attorneys working on a contingency basis have a greater 
incentive to take their cases.43 Since the protections offered by wrongful-discharge doctrines are not equally 
distributed among worker groups, we explore here whether the employment impacts also differ among 
demographic subgroups, defined by gender, education, and age. In Table 5, we take two cuts at the 
                                                     
42 One further concern is that if recent U.S. immigrants are unlikely to take advantage of employment protections, the 
results might be weakened by large concentrations of immigrant workers in certain states. To explore this concern, we 
re-estimated all models in Table 1 for employment and earnings excluding the six high immigration states that contain 
the majority of the nation’s total foreign-born population: CA, FL, IL NY NJ and TX. These results are qualitatively 
identical to the main Table 1 findings (table available from the authors).  
43 Dertouzos, Holland and Ebener (1988) find that plaintiffs in wrongful-discharge cases are typically male (69 
percent), hold executive or managerial positions (53 percent), have 6 or more years of tenure (48 percent), and earn 
considerably above the median wage. 
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estimation. Panel A presents employment impacts in years 1 and 2 following adoption (that is, 13-36 
months after adoption – our baseline specification). Panel B presents longer term results for employment 
effects in years 4 and 5 following adoption.  
The results in Panel A for short-term impacts confirm that the implied-contract doctrine appears to 
reduce employment rates for almost all the identified demographic groups. But the effect is not uniform 
across groups. The largest impacts are found for female, less-educated (high school or less), and younger 
(under age 40) workers. These impacts are in the range of –1.5 to –2.3 percent. Young, less-educated, 
female workers appear to fare worst of all. In addition to the implied-contract effects, we find some limited 
evidence (large point estimates and large standard errors) that the good-faith exception also reduces 
employment rates. But this impact only appears robust for older women.  
These short-term results are consistent with OECD studies that find that employment protections tend to 
differentially harm employment of females, less-experienced workers, and less-skilled workers (Bertola, 
Blau and Khan, 2002; OECD, 1999). Yet these results appear something of a puzzle in the U.S. context. 
Because the wrongful-discharge doctrines studied here increase the expected cost of employing high-tenure, 
high-wage workers, these laws should, over the longer term, lower the employment and earnings of 
protected groups and raise demand for workers who are close substitutes – low-wage and short-tenure 
employees who are unlikely to (successfully) litigate.44 
Panel B of Table 5 examines the evidence for longer-term impacts. Notably, longer-term impacts for 
younger and less educated workers appear less negative than short-term impacts presented in Panel A, while 
longer-term impacts for older and better educated workers appear more negative. In fact, for both sexes and 
both education categories, the point estimate for the employment reduction among older workers is larger 
than for younger workers. This suggests that the larger short-term impacts for low-wage workers seen in 
Panel A may be explained by their high employment flow rates; reductions in hiring will first reduce 
                                                     
44 This may indeed be what occurred with the surge in demand for temporary help employment in states adopting the 
implied-contract exceptions (Miles, 2000; Autor, 2003). 
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employment of groups who enter and exit employment frequently.45 But this discrepancy appears transitory. 
Over the longer term, negative employment consequences appear to accrue for those most protected by the 
wrongful-discharge doctrines. Though we lack sufficient precision to conclude that high-wage workers 
were differentially harmed, there is no evidence that the long-term employment costs were 
disproportionately borne by low-wage workers. 
The results in Table 5 may therefore suggest an important difference between employment protections 
provided in the OECD and United States. Whereas OECD employment protections typically bar 
terminations of senior workers except under very limited circumstances, the wrongful-discharge doctrines 
recognized in the United States provide no such formal employment security. Instead, they allow terminated 
workers to litigate at significant monetary (and psychic) cost. By raising expected employment costs of 
senior workers without providing them formal job security, U.S. wrongful-discharge laws may make it 
more likely that employment of protected groups is ultimately reduced.  
V. Robustness tests: Alternative data sources and outcome measures 
Our analysis so far relies exclusively on the Current Population Survey to measure employment 
outcomes. This presents two limitations. One is that the CPS does not span the entire time period of interest 
for our study. The second is that while the CPS is ideal for measuring employment levels, it is not suitable 
for analyzing worker flows, which should also be affected by employment protections. We address both of 
these limitations here.  
A. Employment estimates using establishment-based data 
Although most precedent-setting wrongful-discharge cases were decided in the 1980s, some state courts 
adopted public-policy, implied-contract, and good-faith exceptions before then (in 1959, 1976 and 1974 
respectively). The monthly Current Population Survey employment data series, which begins in 1978, does 
not cover these early adoptions. A second limitation of the CPS, as a household survey, is that it may not 
                                                     
45 Also notable, the point estimates for longer-term employment effects are larger for females than males. We do not 
believe this pattern reflects gender differences in litigiousness. A 1988 study by Dertouzos, Holland and Ebener found 
that women comprised 31 percent of California wrongful-discharge plaintiffs between 1980 and 1986. Our Current 
Population Survey data indicate that 44 percent of California workers were women in those years.  
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provide as precise an estimate of state employment levels as an establishment-based survey. To partly 
rectify both limitations, we supplement the CPS estimates with data from the Current Employment Statistics 
(CES) for the years 1970 to 1999.  
The CES, collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), is drawn from a probability sample of 
approximately 350,000 establishments. Although these data are collected monthly, new establishments 
enter the data with a significant lag. To compensate for the undercount, BLS applies bias-adjustment factors 
in each month and re-benchmarks the CES totals to national employment in March of each year. 46 For our 
purposes, these bias adjustments have the potential to undermine our state-by-month estimation strategy 
used above if they obscure the response to the legal shock that we try to discern in the monthly data. In 
other words, the BLS adjustments may convey a picture of false stability in the employment data that could 
induce strong ‘consistency bias’ over short time intervals.  To address this concern, we assemble month-of-
March employment data from the CES to form an annual state-by-year employment count panel for 1970 
through 1999. In so doing, we lose the benefit of the monthly analysis that we employed on the CPS data, 
while gaining the advantage of an establishment-based data set covering a longer span of years. 
Using the CES data, we estimate the following difference-in-difference model for the natural logarithm 
of state employment, 
(3) ,)()()()ln( 27 srtssrtsstsrt ttLEmp εγγλδγβ +×+×+×++=  
where stL  is a vector of wrongful-discharge laws that assume the value of 1 in the year following adoption 
forward, and δ , γ  and λ  are vectors of year, state, and region dummies (indicated by subscripts st,  and 
r ). To account for pronounced, differential cross-state and cross-region employment trends (Blanchard and 
Katz, 1992), our preferred specification also controls for quadratic state trends and interactions between 
four region dummies and individual calendar-year dummies.  
The first column of Table 6 presents a model for state employment for the years 1970 through 1999 
                                                     
46 Details on the sampling methods of the CES are found at http://www.bls.gov/sae/790meth.htm (accessed 
8/21/2004). 
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estimated with the CES data. Adoption of an implied-contract exception is associated with a reduction in 
state employment of -2.6 percent, which is statistically significant ( 2.2=t ) and almost twice as large as our 
main estimates (Tables 1 and 2). There is reason to treat this estimate with caution, however: the same 
model also suggests that the good-faith doctrine raised state employment levels by an implausibly large 7.4 
percent ( )7.4=t . This suggests the possibility of confounding state employment trends, a point we explore 
in greater detail in our companion paper, ADS 2004. To control for these trends, column 2 of the table adds 
quadratic state trends and region × year dummies. These variables reduce the magnitude of the implied-
contract effect to -0.9 percentage points ( 2.2=t ), similar to our main estimates. The good-faith and public-
policy doctrines are now insignificant. 47  
We re-estimate the column 2 model separately for manufacturing (column 3) and nonmanufacturing 
(column 4) employment. In both sectors, the implied-contract doctrine reduces employment levels by 
approximately 1 percent (significant at the 5 percent level). Neither of the other two wrongful-discharge 
laws is significant, and the sign for the public-policy doctrine is inconsistent.  
To further test the comparability of the CES and CPS results, we estimate a set of employment models 
using each for the time interval for which both are available: 1978 to 1999. To increase comparability, we 
form an annual state-level employment count using the CPS centered on March of each calendar year.48 
These models, in Panel B of Table 6, yield highly comparable effects of the impact of wrongful-discharge 
doctrines on state employment levels. After controlling for state trends and region effects, we find that the 
implied-contract doctrine is associated with an employment decline of 1.1 to 1.9 percentage points overall, 
but with a larger point estimate for manufacturing using the CPS data (column 8). In the specification 
controlling for employment trends, the good-faith doctrine is never significant, while the public-policy 
doctrine is occasionally negative and significant.  
We emphasize that the state × year estimation methodology in Table 6 is less satisfactory than our 
                                                     
47 Because of the 30-year time span in these specifications, we control flexibly for time trends using quadratic rather 
than (just) linear trends. If instead we only use linear trends, the implied-contract coefficients are unaffected while the 
good-faith coefficients remain significantly positive in some specifications.  
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short-panel approach in previous tables. In particular, the variation exploited has strong serial correlation 
and may be confounded with state and regional employment trends – issues that we addressed above by 
varying the pre- and post- treatment interval, contrasting short and long-term impacts, controlling flexibly 
for regional effects, and examining multiple sub-periods of the data. Nevertheless, the CES results increase 
our confidence in the main findings. 
B. Evidence on employment flows 
As discussed in Section I, theory makes ambiguous predictions about the short-run effect of wrongful-
discharge laws on employment levels. Protection that does not satisfy ‘Coasean’ efficiency should lower 
wages or employment or both in the long run. But in the short run, firing restrictions can either raise or 
lower employment since they reduce incentives to both hire and fire. Regardless of whether firing 
restrictions raise or lower employment levels, they should unambiguously reduce worker flows into and out 
of jobs. Hence, we briefly explore here how wrongful-discharge laws affect employment flows.  
Our CPS data, formed from repeated cross-sections of households, are not suitable for this analysis.49 
As an imperfect substitute, we exploit state-level employment flow data from the Longitudinal Research 
Database (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996). The state-level LRD sample is only available for 1973 
through 1988 and only for the manufacturing sector. A further limitation of the LRD it that it does not 
measure true employment flows – that is, the count of workers exiting and entering jobs. Instead, it 
measures the sum of job losses at contracting establishments (‘job destruction’) and the sum of job gains at 
expanding establishments (‘job creation’), each normalized by total manufacturing employment.   
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48 Specifically, we form a centered average on March of each year using CPS data for January through May. 
49 Though the CPS can be used to track a subset of households over 1 calendar year, the matched samples are 
problematic: job losers are disproportionately likely to change residences and therefore exit the sample (Welch, 1993; 
Madrian and Lefgren, 2000).  
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where the dependent variable is the job-flow measure for manufacturing employment in state s  over years 
t  to 1+t , and stL  is a vector of wrongful-discharge doctrine dummies that assume the value of 1 in the 
year a law is adopted, and the variable sLawYR  equals the year of a state’s adoption. Vectors of time and 
state dummies, δ  and γ , control respectively for aggregate shocks and mean cross-state differences in the 
rate of job creation or destruction. All models are weighted by average state shares of U.S. manufacturing 
employment over 1973 to 1988. 
Prior to estimating equation (4), we tabulate in Appendix Table 3 benchmark estimates of the state-level 
relationship between job creation and destruction and employment growth in manufacturing. Despite the 
limitations noted, the job-flow measures capture a substantial share of the over-time variation in 
manufacturing employment: 1 percentage point of job creation predicts employment growth of 0.7 log 
points ( 16=t ), and 1 percentage point of job destruction predicts an employment decline of 0.8 log points 
( )24=t .50  
Panel A of Table 7 presents estimates of equation (4) for job destruction. The initial model finds some 
evidence that adopting a wrongful-discharge doctrine reduces manufacturing job destruction. Specifically, 
job destruction in the first three years following adoption of any wrongful-discharge law is between 0.2 and 
.6 percentage points lower than prior to law adoption, though these point estimates are not significant. 
Column (2) replaces the any-law variables with separate indicator variables for each of the three wrongful-
discharge doctrines. Here, a somewhat stronger pattern emerges. Job destruction declines noticeably – by 
around .7 to .8 percentage points – in years 2 and 3 following adoption of the implied contract exception, 
though again, the point estimates are not significant at conventional levels. There is no evidence of a decline 
in job destruction in the years following adoption of either the public policy or good faith doctrines.  
Panels B and C of Table 7 repeat these estimates for job creation and for gross job flows, the latter of 
which is the sum of job creation and job destruction. In years 1 through 3 following adoption of an implied-
                                                     
50 The estimates in Appendix 3 are from a variant of equation (4) in which the dependent variable is the state-level first 
difference in log manufacturing employment. Job creation and destruction are included on the right-side of the 
equation, and other control variables are as above.  
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contract exception, there is some evidence of a slowdown in job creation and very strong evidence of a 
reduction in gross job flows. The final estimate indicates a sizable 1.2 percentage point reduction in gross 
job flows in the third year following adoption of the implied-contract exception ( 3.2t = ). The good faith 
doctrine is also associated with a significant reduction in job creation and a marginally significant decline in 
gross job flows – but this result did not prove robust to inclusion of 4 region by year dummy variables (not 
shown) and hence we are not confident of its validity.51 For the public policy doctrine, no clear pattern 
emerges.  
Do these estimates support the inference that wrongful-discharge laws reduced job flows? In the case of 
the implied-contract doctrine, the answer appears to be a qualified yes. In the years immediately following 
adoption of this doctrine, job creation appears to slow (albeit not significantly), followed in years 2 and 3 by 
a significant reduction in job destruction. Consistent with the evidence in Table 4, these estimates imply a 
dip in employment followed by a moderate employment rebound. It bears emphasis that these job-flow 
results do not correspond perfectly to our main estimates; the estimated 0.5 percentage-point slowdown in 
job creation is not large enough to account for -0.9 percentage point reduction in manufacturing 
employment estimated for the comparable time period (Table 6, Column 6).Given the many sources of 
slippage in the LRD data, however, we believe this evidence supports the main results. 52  
VI. Conclusion 
 
We find ourselves taking a middle position between those who suggest that the adoption of exceptions 
to employment at will has had a major negative impact on employment (particularly Dertouzos and Karoly, 
1992) and those who find that the exceptions have had no impact (Miles, 2000). We find a statistically 
significant negative impact on employment, but it emanates from only one of the legal exceptions – the 
implied-contract doctrine – and its adoption causes a decline of from 0.8 to 1.7 percent in the ratio of 
                                                     
51 A table of results is available from the authors 
52 Complementing this evidence, Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004, Tables 3 and 4) find that adoption of wrongful-
discharge doctrines – particularly the implied-contract and good faith exceptions – significantly slowed the rate of job 
accession for unemployed workers in adopting states. This supports the conclusion that adoption of these doctrines 
dampened labor market flows. 
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employment to population, which is between one-third and one-fifth the estimated magnitude offered by 
Dertouzos and Karoly (1992). While the matter can never be free from doubt in statistical studies of this 
kind, the robustness of our findings across specifications, demographic groups, time periods, and data 
sources suggests that our findings reflect a causal effect of adoption of the implied-contract exception.  
We stress that our paper does not attempt to provide an overall assessment of wrongful-discharge laws. 
We have not offered any evaluation of the benefits of such laws to workers and the public. The fact that 
there is some reduction in employment – for women, younger workers, and less-educated men in the short 
term, and potentially for older and more educated workers in the longer term – underscores that legal 
protections do not come costlessly.  
Those steeped in the view that low transaction costs would give rise to a Coasean invariance prediction 
might be surprised by the finding that the implied-contract doctrine reduces employment when it would 
seem that simple changes to personnel policies could easily negate the legal effectiveness of this exception. 
Conversely, others might see the apparent inability to contract costlessly around legal rules as further 
confirmation that the invariance prediction of the Coase Theorem frequently does not obtain in labor 
markets (Donohue, 1989). Still, the evidence that the depressing employment impact of the implied-contract 
doctrine dissipated after six or seven years may suggest that over time employers were able to circumvent 
the costs of the law or came to realize that these costs would be small. Part of the reason for the initial drop 
in employment might have been uncertainty about how far courts would push these exceptions, so that it 
took time for that information to be revealed and for employers to contract around the exception (which 
they could certainly do more readily with respect to new hires than with incumbent workers). 
 Our finding that the implied-contract exception generated at least short-term employment drops 
without corresponding drops in wages merits discussion. A simple supply and demand model would suggest 
that by raising total employment costs, adoption of the implied-contract doctrine should have caused an 
inward shift in labor demand, leading to lower employment and wage levels. Moreover, if workers valued 
the protection provided by this doctrine, total labor supply should have shifted outward, mitigating the 
employment effect but augmenting the wage effect. In other words, the observed drop in employment 
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suggests a backward demand shift, which should have lowered wages, and any supply stimulus should only 
have accentuated the wage drop. 
Why then did wages not fall, even during the period when employment fell? A number of possibilities 
must be considered. First, an outward supply shift that would accentuate a drop in wages probably did not 
occur because workers did not greatly value the benefit of the implied-contract exception. This could occur 
if the expected benefit to the worker was in fact low, perhaps because much of the money changing hands 
in wrongful-discharge cases would be paid to attorneys. Alternatively, workers might not perceive a benefit 
from such judicial decisions because, as considerable evidence suggests, they tend to believe that they 
already are protected against unjust dismissal, even when they clearly are not. According to Kim (1997), 
“workers consistently overestimate their legal rights, with overwhelming majorities (as high as 89%) 
believing that they are legally protected against arbitrary and unjust discharges when in fact they can be 
dismissed at will.”   
A second possibility is that the violation of the predictions of the simple supply and demand framework 
in this context is more fundamental. In contrast to this framework, standard flow models of the labor market 
imply that employment protections raise wages (and reduce employment) by increasing workers’ 
bargaining power (cf. Blanchard and Portugal, 2001). The logic of this argument is that firing costs induce 
employers to accept higher wage demands because the alternative of laying off workers who are pushing for 
higher wages would trigger the firing cost. Hence, in aggregate, employment protection creates two 
countervailing effects on wage levels: by shifting labor demand inward, it puts downward pressure on 
wages; by providing incumbent workers with enhanced bargaining power, it exerts upward pressure. 
According to the evidence presented here, the net effect of these two influences for recent wrongful-
discharge protections adopted in the United States is to lower employment modestly while leaving overall 
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Figure 1. State Log Employment to Population Rates Pre- and Post- Adoption of Implied Contract 
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Point Estimate Robust 90 Percent Confidence Interval
B. Females
Figure 2. State Log Employment to Population Rates Pre- and Post- Adoption of Public Policy 
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Figure 3. State Log Employment to Population Rates Pre- and Post- Adoption of Good Faith Exception: 
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Point Estimate Robust 90 Percent Confidence Interval
B. Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2)
-1.72 -1.59 -3.04 -2.89 -1.10 -1.18 0.54 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.60 0.49
(0.55) (0.45) (1.87) (1.54) (0.84) (0.504) (0.84) (0.76) (0.71) (0.65) (0.96) (0.84)
R2 0.870 0.894 0.932 0.944 0.926 0.944 0.234 0.235 0.320 0.321 0.220 0.221
n
-0.23 -0.07 1.75 0.12 -0.65 0.01 -0.69 -0.51 0.18 0.25 -0.99 -0.84
(0.80) (0.59) (1.91) (1.62) (0.89) (0.60) (0.56) (0.57) (0.71) (0.53) (0.62) (0.63)
R2 0.848 0.875 0.935 0.944 0.918 0.936 0.233 0.233 0.321 0.322 0.219 0.219
n
-0.37 -0.63 5.62 1.71 -1.88 -0.45 -1.28 -0.37 -2.22 -1.70 -1.28 -0.18
(0.61) (0.88) (1.92) (2.55) (0.79) (1.02) (1.44) (1.79) (1.22) (1.43) (1.59) (1.84)
R2 0.852 0.883 0.929 0.941 0.916 0.935 0.229 0.230 0.310 0.311 0.216 0.217
n
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
378,217 1,505,043
Region x year 
dummies











Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on State Employment to Population 
Ratio and Hourly Earnings:   Contrasting Outcomes in Years Two and Three Following Adoption to Years One and 
Two Preceding Adoption.
A. 100 x ln(Employment/Population): 1978 - 1999 B. 100 x ln(Hourly Wage): 1979 - 1999
Panel A. Each entry is from a separate weighted OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the log of the state-
month employment (in the designated sector) to population ratio for residents ages 16 - 64 in 50 U.S. states. Employment 
is estimated from complete combined Current Population Survey monthly files for 1978 - 1999. All models include state 
main effects and indicators for each year x month in the sample. Models in even numbered columns also include 
interactions between 4 Census region dummies and individual calendar year dummies. Models are weighted by state's 
share of national population ages 16 - 64 in each month-year using CPS sampling weights. Huber-White robust standard 
errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
Panel B. Each entry is from a separate weighted OLS regression of log real hourly earnings of currently employed 
wage/salary, non-self-employed workers ages 16 - 64. Wages are calculated from the Current Population Survey Merged 
Outoing Rotation Group files for 1979 - 1999 as the log of usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours. Top-
coded observations are multiplied by 1.5 and wages below $1.50 or above $100 per hour in real 2000 dollars (using the 
Personal Consumption Expenditure deflator) are discarded. All models include state main effects, dummy variables for 
each year x month in the sample, and dummies for 8 demographic groups: males/female x high school or less/some-
college or more x ages 16-39/40-64. Models in even numbered columns also include interactions between 4 Census 
region dummies and individual calendar year dummies. Regressions are weighted by CPS earnings weights. Huber-White 
robust standard errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states. 
Treatment sample in each panel includes observations for 1 to 24 months prior and 13 - 36 months following adoption of 
relevant doctrine in adopting states (months 0 - 12 following adoption are omitted). Control sample includes maximal set 
of observations for corresponding calendar months from states that did not adopt any of the three doctrines during the 
relevant pre/post treatment time interval. The coefficient reported is the interaction between treatment status (i.e., 
adopting a doctrine) and an indicator for 13 - 36 months post adoption.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-0.75 -0.63 0.53 -0.38 -0.97 -0.63
(0.55) (0.40) (1.24) (1.06) (0.70) (0.43)
-1.63 -1.44 -3.32 -2.52 -0.96 -1.14
(0.55) (0.45) (1.57) (1.38) (0.73) (0.55)
-0.18 -0.10 1.61 -0.29 -0.58 0.07
(0.67) (0.46) (1.72) (1.47) (0.75) (0.49)
-0.72 -0.73 4.98 1.88 -2.42 -0.96
(0.56) (0.62) (1.69) (1.67) (0.75) (0.66)
R2 0.845 0.877 0.853 0.880 0.922 0.937 0.926 0.938 0.911 0.935 0.917 0.936
n
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
0.26 0.44 0.75 0.66 0.16 0.37
(0.60) (0.62) (0.55) (0.50) (0.67) (0.69)
0.75 0.49 0.71 0.55 0.86 0.58
(0.81) (0.72) (0.72) (0.63) (0.91) (0.78)
-1.11 -0.25 0.01 0.63 -1.47 -0.59
(0.70) (0.58) (0.76) (0.58) (0.77) (0.64)
-0.76 -0.01 -1.98 -1.54 -0.63 0.29
(1.32) (1.67) (1.25) (1.15) (1.51) (1.78)
R2 0.232 0.232 0.232 0.232 0.310 0.316 0.315 0.316 0.218 0.219 0.218 0.219
n
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
2,033,235
A. 100 x ln(Employment/Population), 1978 - 1999
B. 100 x ln(Hourly Wage), 1979 - 1999
10,465 10,465 10,465
Good Faith
Region x year 
dummies
2,551,552 518,317












Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on Employment and 
Hourly Wages, 1978 - 1999: Contrasting the Impact of any Doctrine Versus Specific Doctrines.
All Industries Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing
Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlation within states. 
Dependent variables, samples, and weights are as in Table 1, panels A and B. Coefficients reported are the 
interactions between treatment status (i.e., adopting any doctrine or a specific doctrine) and an indicator for 13 - 
36 months post adoption. 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
-1.56 -0.94 0.35 0.69 -0.14 0.10
(0.63) (0.40) (0.88) (0.75) (0.58) (0.61)
R2 0.875 0.887 0.864 0.876 0.871 0.882
n
States adopting
-1.56 -1.47 -1.39 -0.85 -3.10 -2.50
(1.11) (0.78) (1.01) (0.87) (0.71) (0.81)
R2 0.905 0.914 0.896 0.904 0.905 0.912
n
States adopting
-1.79 -1.81 2.21 1.05 2.08 2.77
(1.45) (1.46) (0.66) (0.55) (0.55) (0.94)
R2 0.854 0.888 0.853 0.881 0.857 0.887
n
States adopting





No Yes No Yes No Yes
2,564
Table 3:
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful 
Discharge Laws on Employment to Population Rates: Estimates 
by Adopter Cohorts. 1978-1999
Dependent Variable: 100 x ln(Employment/Population)
1980 - 1983














Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses allow for 
unrestricted error correlation within states. Dependent variables, 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
-1.63 -1.44 -1.10 -0.94 -1.59 -1.51 -1.24 -1.36 -0.52 -0.83 -1.68 -1.45 -1.58 -1.32
(0.55) (0.45) (0.46) (0.36) (0.56) (0.54) (0.66) (0.66) (0.71) (0.66) (0.68) (0.56) (0.84) (0.74)
-0.18 -0.10 0.00 0.03 -0.08 -0.11 0.21 -0.19 0.78 0.17 -0.26 -0.19 -0.28 -0.18
(0.67) (0.46) (0.43) (0.32) (0.80) (0.56) (0.87) (0.57) (0.87) (0.52) (0.81) (0.57) (0.87) (0.66)
-0.72 -0.73 -0.39 -0.38 -1.35 -1.30 -1.03 -0.71 -0.94 -0.88 -0.38 -0.59 -0.33 -0.70
(0.56) (0.62) (0.40) (0.42) (0.58) (0.69) (0.69) (0.79) (0.96) (1.03) (0.66) (0.77) (0.97) (1.06)
R2 0.853 0.880 0.853 0.879 0.852 0.880 0.859 0.887 0.864 0.891 0.851 0.879 0.851 0.880
n
No YesNo YesNo Yes No Yes
9,964 9,527
Region x year 
dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes






Yrs -3 and -2 Yrs -4 and -3
Yrs 1 and 2 Yrs 0 and 1 Yrs 2 and 3 Yrs 4 and 5 Yrs 6 and 7 Yrs 1 and 2 Yrs 1 and 2
Yrs - 2 and -1 Yrs -2 and -1 Yrs -2 and -1 Yrs -2 and -1 Yrs -2 and -1
Table 4:
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on Log Employment to Population 
Rates for Years 1978 - 1999: Testing Sensitivity to Selection of Pre- and Post- Adoption Treatment Periods.
Dependent Variable: 100 x ln(Employment/Population)
Baseline
Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlation within states. Samples, 
specifications and weights are identical to Table 2 except, as noted, varying selection of pre- and post- treatment intervals 
surrounding law adoption.
18 - 39 40 - 64 18 - 39 40 - 64 18 - 39 40 - 64 18 - 39 40 - 64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-1.60 -1.73 -0.63 -0.68 -2.17 -2.62 -1.39 0.23
(0.81) (0.44) (0.40) (0.55) (0.89) (0.91) (0.55) (0.62)
0.20 -0.50 0.04 -0.24 -0.17 0.31 -1.22 0.24
(0.84) (0.65) (0.44) (0.59) (0.86) (0.89) (0.52) (1.04)
-2.69 1.07 0.22 0.78 -1.88 -0.22 -1.13 -3.50
(1.47) (1.10) (0.52) (0.56) (1.83) (1.36) (0.73) (1.37)
R2 0.702 0.643 0.621 0.505 0.782 0.761 0.697 0.684
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-1.09 -1.53 -0.43 -0.72 -0.70 -3.63 -0.57 -1.79
(0.93) (0.65) (0.41) (0.62) (1.01) (1.52) (0.71) (0.86)
0.21 -0.76 0.29 -0.81 0.74 0.47 -0.83 0.94
(0.70) (0.75) (0.47) (0.73) (1.22) (1.25) (0.76) (1.00)
-1.96 0.95 0.45 0.87 -2.04 -0.80 -1.32 -0.71
(1.07) (1.37) (0.64) (0.84) (2.03) (2.25) (1.41) (1.79)
R2 0.667 0.614 0.614 0.511 0.782 0.776 0.705 0.719
n
Table 5:
Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on Log Employment to 
Population Rates by Gender, Age and Education Subgroups. 1978-1999








Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses allow for unrestricted error correlation 
within each state. Separate regressions in each column contrast employment of the 
specified demographic group in years 1 and 2 following adoption of a doctrine (panel A) or 
years 4 and 5 following adoption (panel B) relative to the 2 years immediately prior to 
adoption of the doctrine. All models include state and year dummies and region x year 
dummies. Samples, specifications, and weights are identical to Table 2, column 4. 
A. Years 1,2 following adoption relative to 2 Years prior to adoption
A. Years 4,5 following adoption relative to 2 Years prior to adoption






Manuf Non-Man All Manuf Non-Man Manuf Non-Man Manuf Non-Man
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (8)
-2.65 -1.03 -1.06 -1.06 -0.77 -1.18 -0.68 -2.36 -1.14 -1.31 -1.09 -3.94 -1.90 -3.62 -1.36
(1.20) (0.41) (0.54) (0.42) (0.48) (0.66) (0.48) (0.94) (0.52) (0.61) (0.52) (0.94) (0.48) (1.21) (0.51)
1.23 -0.12 0.34 -0.19 0.09 -0.18 0.14 4.85 -0.38 0.07 -0.40 3.10 -1.33 0.08 -1.68
(1.35) (0.48) (0.64) (0.47) (0.44) (0.66) (0.44) (0.92) (0.55) (0.66) (0.57) (0.97) (0.52) (1.22) (0.60)
7.49 1.59 1.52 1.39 0.14 1.41 -0.32 6.33 -1.17 -0.55 -1.62 9.33 -0.78 0.24 -1.10
(1.56) (1.02) (1.16) (1.02) (0.64) (0.93) (0.66) (1.58) (0.94) (1.17) (0.95) (1.69) (0.98) (2.17) (1.17)
R2 0.990 0.999 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.996 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.996 1.000 0.997 0.999
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
n
Table 6:
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on Employment Levels, 1970 - 1999: Annual Estimates from the 
Current Population Survey and Current Employment Statistics.









State trends + 
region x year 
dummies
A. Current Employment Statistics
B. Comparison of Current Employment Statistics and Current Population 





Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses account for unrestricted error correlations by state. All models include include state and year dummy 
variables. As indicated, models also include quadratic state x time interactions and interactions between 4 Census geographic regions and individual year 
dummies. Dependent variables is 100 x the natural logarithm of estimated state employment in the indicated years and sectors. Current Employment 
Statistics data are month of March state employment estimates. Current Population Survey data are calculated from complete CPS monthly files for 
January - May (centered on March) of each calendar year. Dummies for adoption of legal doctrines are lagged by one year. All estimates weighted by 
state's share of national population ages 16 - 64 in each year. 
(1) (1) (1)
Time relative to Implied Public Good Implied Public Good Implied Public Good
law adoption Any Contract Policy Faith Any Contract Policy Faith Any Contract Policy Faith
Year 0 -0.44 0.25 -0.69 0.32 0.23 0.08 0.45 -1.29 -0.21 0.33 -0.24 -0.98
(0.40) (0.34) (0.44) (0.37) (0.29) (0.27) (0.26) (0.69) (0.47) (0.39) (0.47) (0.82)
Year 1 -0.21 0.17 0.01 1.09 -0.19 -0.35 -0.14 -1.06 -0.39 -0.18 -0.13 0.02
(0.48) (0.47) (0.58) (0.37) (0.46) (0.40) (0.34) (0.65) (0.53) (0.33) (0.65) (0.59)
Year 2 -0.63 -0.77 -0.17 -0.56 0.31 -0.10 0.35 -0.39 -0.32 -0.87 0.18 -0.95
(0.47) (0.59) (0.51) (0.89) (0.45) (0.39) (0.36) (0.60) (0.41) (0.55) (0.46) (0.55)
Year 3 0.08 -0.71 1.00 0.27 -0.50 -0.50 -0.58 -1.10 -0.42 -1.22 0.41 -0.83
(0.85) (0.57) (0.91) (0.78) (0.48) (0.41) (0.50) (0.77) (0.50) (0.38) (0.53) (0.51)
Year 4+ 0.11 -0.06 0.42 0.55 0.23 -0.03 0.52 -1.29 0.34 -0.09 0.93 -0.75
(0.58) (0.62) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37) (0.39) (0.26) (0.54) (0.45) (0.51) (0.45) (0.40)
R2 0.755 0.774 0.742
A. Job Destruction 
Estimated Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on Annual Job Flows in Manufacturing, 1973 to 1988.








Job Destruction + Job Creation 
Table 7:
n = 752 observations (47 states x 16 years). Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses account for unrestricted error 
correlations within each state. Each numbered column is from a separate OLS regression of manufacturing employment flows by 
state and calendar year on leads and lags of wrongful discharge law adoption. All models include state and year dummies. Job 
creation (destruction) is the absolute value of the employment weighted mean percentage point change in employment in 
manufacturing plants experiencing employment increases (declines). All estimates are weighted by state mean share of national 
manufacturing employment over 1973 - 1988. Alaska, Rhode Island, Hawaii and District of Columbia are excluded from 
estimates. Data are from Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), and are available for download at 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/haltiwanger/download.htm. 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
New England
Connecticut P1 G6 P G P G P G P G C10 P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
Maine C11 C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C 
Massachusetts G7 G G P5 G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G C5 P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
New Hampshire P2 G2 P G P G P G P G P G P G5 P P P P P P P C8 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Rhode Island 
Vermont C8 C P9 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Middle Atlantic
New Jersey P7 P P P P C5 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
New York C11 C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C 
Pennsylvania P3 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
East North Central
Illinois C12 C C C C P12 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Indiana P5 P P P P P P P P P P P P P C8 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Michigan P6 P P P C6 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Ohio C4 C C C C C C C C P3 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Wisconsin P1 P P P P C6 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
West North Central
Iowa P7 P C11 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Kansas P6 P P C8 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Minnesota C4 C C C P11 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Missouri C1 C C P11 C P C P C2 P P P P P P P P P P P P
Nebraska C11 C C C C P11 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
North Dakota C2 C C C P11 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
South Dakota C4 C C C C C P12 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
South Atlantic
 Delaware P3 G4 P G P G P G P G P G P G P G
Florida
Georgia
Maryland P7 P P P C1 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
North Carolina P5 P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
South Carolina P11 P C6 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Virginia C9 C C P6 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
West Virginia P7 P P P P P P P C4 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
East South Central
Alabama C7 C C C C C C C C C C C C 
Kentucky C8 P11 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Mississippi P7 P P P P C6 P CP CP C P C P C P C P C P
Tennessee C11 C C C P8 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
West South Central
Arkansas P3 P P P C6 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Louisiana G1 G
Oklahoma C12 C C C C C C C C C G5 C G C G C G C P2 G2 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Appendix Table 1:
 Wrongful Discharge Laws by Region, State and Year
Key:   C – Implied Contract,   P – Public Policy,   G – Good Faith.  (Month of Adoption Indicated by Numbers 1 - 12)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Appendix Table 1:
 Wrongful Discharge Laws by Region, State and Year
Key:   C – Implied Contract,   P – Public Policy,   G – Good Faith.  (Month of Adoption Indicated by Numbers 1 - 12)
Texas P6 C4 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Mountain
Arizona C6 C4 P6 G6 P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G P G
Colorado C10 C C P9 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Idaho C4 P4 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P G8 C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
Montana P1 P P G1 P G P G P G P G C6 P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
Nevada C8 C P1 C P C P C P G2 C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
New Mexico C2 C C C P7 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Utah C5 C C C P3 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Wyoming C8 C C C C P7 C P C P C P C P C P G1 C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
Pacific
Alaska C5 G5 C G C G C P2 G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
California P P C3 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P G10 C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G C P G
Hawaii P10 P P P C8 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Oregon P6 P P C3 P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Washington C8 C C C C C C C P7 C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
Source: Authors' analysis of case law.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2)
-1.83 -1.57 -2.97 -2.56 -1.29 -1.20 0.55 0.55 0.45 0.53 0.65 0.57
(0.58) (0.44) (1.75) (1.48) (0.84) (0.511) (0.84) (0.73) (0.72) (0.58) (0.95) (0.81)
R2 0.870 0.894 0.949 0.954 0.928 0.947 0.235 0.235 0.326 0.327 0.218 0.219
n
-0.30 -0.04 1.37 0.18 -0.68 -0.03 -0.71 -0.48 0.14 0.11 -1.00 -0.77
(0.81) (0.62) (1.91) (1.69) (0.90) (0.63) (0.58) (0.57) (0.74) (0.53) (0.63) (0.63)
R2 0.827 0.865 0.947 0.955 0.915 0.938 0.236 0.237 0.327 0.327 0.221 0.221
n
-0.33 -0.44 5.94 2.13 -1.93 -0.29 -1.34 -0.45 -2.21 -1.67 -1.35 -0.30
(0.63) (0.81) (1.93) (2.20) (0.83) (1.02) (1.43) (1.75) (1.19) (1.42) (1.59) (1.79)
R2 0.872 0.897 0.930 0.943 0.920 0.938 0.230 0.230 0.311 0.312 0.217 0.218
n
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Appendix Table 2:
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws on State Employment to Population 
Ratio and Hourly Earnings, 1978 - 1999: 
Models Excluding Previously 'Treated' State-Month Observations from the Control Sample
A. 100 x ln(Employment/Population): 1978 - 1999 B. 100 x ln(Hourly Wage): 1979 - 1999
Implied 
Contract
5,404 5,404 5,404 1,402,130 303,697 1,098,433
All Employment Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing All Employment Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing
Public Policy
5,640 5,640 5,640 1,565,684 330,649 1,235,035
Good Faith
371,884 1,443,378
Region x year 
dummies
6,832 6,832 6,832 1,815,262
Samples and models are identical to Table 1 except that state-month observations from states that have already adopted 
a law during the sample period are not used in the 'control state'  sample in months 37-plus following law adoption. For 
details, see Notes to Table 1 and footnote 30 in the text.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Job creation 0.74 0.73
(0.05) (0.05)
Job destruction -0.83 -0.81
(0.03) (0.04)
Gross: Creation + Destruction -0.45 -0.45
(0.06) (0.06)
Net: Creation-Destruction 0.79 0.78
(0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.927 0.939 0.793 0.845 0.926 0.939
No Yes No Yes No YesRegion x year dummies
Appendix Table 3:
Relationship Between Job Creation and Destruction and Employment in 
Manufacturing, 1973 to 1988.
Dependent variable: 100 x ∆ ln(State Manufacturing Employment)
n = 752 observations (47 states x 16 years). Huber-White robust standard errors in 
parentheses account for unrestricted error correlations within each state. Each numbered 
column is from a separate OLS regression of 100 x the annual change in log state 
manufacturing employment on job creation (destruction), defined as the absolute value of 
the employment weighted mean percentage point change in employment in manufacturing 
plants experiencing employment increases (declines). All models include state and year 
dummies. Models in even numbered columns additionally contain interactions between 4 
Census geographic regions and calendar year dummies. Estimates are weighted by state 
mean share of national manufacturing employment over 1973 - 1988. Alaska, Rhode 
Island, Hawaii and District of Columbia are excluded from estimates. Data are from Davis, 
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996).
